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The court has evidenced a general tendency to view expro-
priation not so much as a taking of corporeal property as a situa-
tion involving injury to an owner through a destruction of his
rights which he holds in relation to his property.3 51
Apart from the differences relative to forced sales and assess-
ment value, Louisiana is generally in line with other jurisdictions
on matters of eminent domain. The litigation has come about
for the most part in simple factual situations. Thus the extensive
judicial refinement and elaboration of rules which is found in
certain other states is not found in Louisiana. The existing rules
are, however, quite practically workable and generally sufficient.
Joseph G. Hebert
Conflict of Laws -Rules on Marital Property
"Marital property" means the interests which arise in one
spouse, with respect to things owned or acquired by the other
spouse, solely by virtue of the marriage relation. Though each
of the United States has its own particular set of laws govern-
ing marital property, the systems of marital property law of our
country may be considered as belonging to one or the other of
two greatly different categories: separate property states form
one category; community property states the other. The present
ease of transportation coupled with the constant growth of our
country provide an ever-increasing volume of choice of law prob-
lems concerning the divergencies of these two systems.
Conflict of laws rules arise because different jurisdictions
have different laws; when operative facts of a case involve two
or more jurisdictions, the laws of which differ on the point at
issue, the forum must make a choice of law. The forum which
undertakes this choice does so in pursuance of certain policies.
Five of the most important policy considerations have been listed
as:
"1. Policy in favor of treating the estate of the spouses as
a unit with all elements of it governed by the same rules.
351. Property may be looked on as corporeal property or as a "bundle of rights."
Two interesting articles dealing with the concept of property are Bowen, The Con-
cept of Private Property, 11 CoRN. L.Q. 41 (1925) ; Cormack, Legal Concepts in
Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALEi L.J. 221 (1931).
19581
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"2. Policy of fulfilling the normal expectations of the
spouses as to the applicable law.
"3. Policy of fulfilling the normal expectations of purchasers
and creditors.
"4. Policy protecting and continuing acquired interests in
either spouse with respect to things acquired by the other or by
himself.
"5. Policy in favor of adopting rules which are susceptible
of the most efficient administration at the forum."'
Often cases arise in which these policies cannot be reconciled
one with the other. For instance, the fulfillment of the expecta-
tions of a creditor may preclude the protection of one spouse's
acquired interest. In such cases the forum must determine which
policy or policies it deems most important and accordingly apply
the law of one or the other of the jurisdictions involved.2 After
weighing the policies, the court enunciates its decision in the
form of a conflict of laws rule; these rules designate a particular
jurisdiction so that the laws of that jurisdiction will be applied to
the facts at hand.
Ante-Nuptial Contracts
Obviously, problems in the law concerning marital property
would be considerably simplified if all property of a husband and
wife were governed by the law of some single jurisdiction. It
was early realized that this convenient state of affairs could be
achieved by a valid ante-nuptial contract which would determine
all present and future property relations of the spouses wherever
they might go.
Express ante-nuptial contracts became common in parts of
Europe. In fact, the ease of determination of property rights
made these contracts so popular with the Continental courts that
they began to find "tacit" contracts on the part of marrying
1. MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 94 (1952).
2. There is controversy among the legal writers as to whether the forum should
,:hoose the law of one of the jurisdictions involved and apply it in its entirety, or
whether the forum should choose the result that would be granted in one juris-
diction and then achieve that result through the most similar laws of its own
jurisdiction, or, third, whether the forum should meld parts of both laws and thus
apply a new body of law found only in conflict of laws cases. Of course, in the
interest of uniformity and predictability, established conflict of laws rules are to
be followed in stereotyped cases. See 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A Co -
PAEuATivE STUDY 47-60 (1945).
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couples, such that by the act of marrying in a jurisdiction the
spouses were deemed to have tacitly contracted that the laws of
that jurisdiction govern their marital property.8 The conflict of
laws rule embodying the tacit contract theory is: The law of the
place of the marriage determines the marital property rights.
However, it was unreasonable to apply the laws of the place
of the marriage to the property, present and future, of couples
who were married in transit, or in some vacation area, and who
might never physically be in that geographical jurisdiction again.
To remedy this, a modification of the tacit contract theory was
soon developed. This modification is called the "intended domi-
cile" theory, and as stated by the courts, is: The laws of the juris-
diction in which the spouses intend, at the time of their mar-
riage, to establish their home shall determine their property
rights .4
The unity of marital property laws achieved in Europe by
express and tacit contracts was not so readily available in the
United States. This was due to administrative difficulties. Be-
cause of the heavy immigration into the United States, coupled
with the inaccessibility of the foreign laws, or at least their un-
familiarity to our judges, American courts have followed a policy
of construing written ante-nuptial contracts as intended to gov-
ern only that marital property acquired in the first matrimonial
domicile.5 Mr. Justice Story's remark that these contracts should
have extra-territorial effect only "if they speak to that very
point" has set the standard for enforcement by American courts.
The same reason for their aversion to written ante-nuptial con-
tracts has also kept our courts from applying the tacit contract
theory.7
3. See id. at 368. It is still unsettled as to whether England implies ante-
nuptial contracts. See DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 797 (6th ed. 1949) and the
ensuing discussion of the famous case of Lashley v. Hog, 4 Paton 581 (H.L. 1804).
4. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 193, 194 (5th ed. 1857); CHESHIRE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (3d ed. 1947).
5. Tourn6 v. Tourn6, 9 La. 452 (1836); Hoefer v. Probasco, 80 Okla. 261,
196 Pac. 138 (1921); Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 Pac. 1025 (1913);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289, Comment b (1934). But now that for-
eign laws are more easily accessible, and the vast majority of conflicts problems
today involve the construing of laws of another of the states of the Union, there
is no reason for not giving full effect to written ante-nuptial contracts. Accord:
Sanger v. Sanger, 132 Kan. 596, 296 Pac. 355 (1931). See MARSH, MARITAL
PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 230 (1952).
6. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (5th ed. 1857).
7. The leading case is Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569, 16 Am. Dec.
212 (La. 1827) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1934) ; I RABEL, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 347 (1945). However, the intended
domicile was discussed in a few early cases, but only one was found which was




Instead of looking to the place of the marriage or the intended
domicile, American courts have employed the common law rule
that the domicile of the husband at the time of the marriage is
the first matrimonial domicile.8 The determination of the first
matrimonial domicile was at one time very important because
of the vast differences that existed between the laws of com-
munity property states and of separate property states relative
to property owned by the individual spouses before marriage.9
In community property states, property owned by either spouse
before marriage remained his or hers after marriage."0 But by
the laws of the separate property states which retained the com-
mon law in regard to marital property, previously owned per-
sonal property of the wife passed to the husband in complete
ownership at the marriage." Thus, whether or not the wife re-
tained her personal property owned before marriage hinged
upon this selection. But today the decision as to just which was
the first matrimonial domicile has lost a great deal of its im-
portance since by the passage of the Married Women's Emanci-
pation Acts the wife has much the same rights in her previously
owned property under either property system. 12 The problems
which arise now are mainly those involving property acquired
after marriage.
No conflict of laws problem is presented when husband and
wife acquire property within their matrimonial domicile. How-
ever, in rejecting the tacit contract theories, American courts
recognize that there may be subsequent matrimonial domiciles.
They further recognize that each domicile should provide the
law for its present domiciliaries. 13 Thus problems arise concern-
8. See BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM BEALE'S TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 27.2 (1935) and the cases cited therein. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27,
Comment b (1934).
9. The common law rights of curtesy, dower, and jure uxoris had a definite
effect on the ownership and alienability of the previously owned property of both
spouses. These rights would take effect if the marriage was contracted in a state
retaining the common law, but not so if the marriage was contracted in one of the
community property states. See CASNER & LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY
282 (1951) ; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 167 (1935).
10. MCKAY, A TREATISE ON TILE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 662, 665
(2d ed. 1925).
11. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 484 (3d ed. 1939) ; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS 167 (1935).
12. For a survey of the development, with tables of the state statutes, see 3
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 216-18, 227-28 (1935).
13. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1934). See STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 18 (2d ed. 1951).
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ing what happens to the property rights if the domicile is
changed to another type jurisdiction, or if property is acquired
in a jurisdiction having a different system of -laws from that
of the present domicile. The rules regulating these problems are
the products of the policy considerations mentioned previously.
Movables
In recognition that movables are likely to be taken to the
domicile of the acquirers, the rule has been formulated that the
law of the domicile at the time of acquisition governs interests
in movables. 14 This rule embodies the policies of unity of laws
and convenience at the forum; the court need apply only one set
of laws, that of the domicile, to any number of movables ac-
quired in any number of jurisdictions so long as a single domi-
cile has been retained. When the domicile is changed, however,
another single set of laws, that of the new domicile, is applied
to all movables acquired while that new domicile is retained.
Thus the conflict of laws rule for movables has not only a par-
ticular geographical factor, the domicile, but also a time factor,
the time of acquisition. It is through this time factor that the
laws of the subsequent domicile are applied; without it, Ameri-
can courts would be recognizing a rule having the same effect,
including the difficulties, of the tacit contract theory previously
discussed, i.e., the law of the first matrimonial domicile would
govern all future acquisitions. The leading case disclaiming the
tacit contract effect and proclaiming that property acquired
after a change in domicile is governed by the laws of the new
domicile is Saul v. His Creditors.5 In that case Saul and his
wife were first domiciled in Virginia, a separate property state,
but Saul acquired the property in question after they changed
their domicile to Louisiana. The wife died and the children
claimed one-half of it as community property against the credi-
tors of the husband, who relied on the theory that the law of the
first domicile, Virginia, would govern all acquisitions. The de-
cision of the court in favor of the children, and Mr. Justice
Story's comments on the case, 16 have firmly established the "par-
14. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 124 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 313 (2d ed. 1951) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 (1934).
15. 5 Mart.(N.S.) 569 (La. 1827).
16. STORY, -CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 157-58 (5th ed. 1857). There Story said that
marital property laws have only territorial effect, being statutes real and not
statutes personal, i.e., they can only extend to the domiciliaries while the doci-
ciliaries are within the jurisdiction. That this view is not entirely correct will be
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tial mutability,"'17 or time element, in our conflict of laws rule
governing movables.
The policy of protecting an acquired interest requires that
when a change of domicile occurs the rights in property acquired
while in the former domicile be retained. Thus property acquired
by a husband or wife while domiciled in a separate property
state remains separately his or hers after the domicile is changed
to a community property state. That separate property is treated
by the community property state's courts essentially the same
as the separate property of the spouses provided for by the do-
mestic law of the community state,"' e.g., that property owned
by either spouse before marriage. Since there is no provision
for community property in the domestic law of separate prop-
erty states, their laws or rules on trusts have been employed to
determine the manner in which the community property is
"owned" in the separate property state. A husband who holds
community funds while newly domiciled in a separate property
state has been deemed to be in the same position as any other
domiciliary of that state who holds the property of another per-
son in his own name; a constructive trust is held to be estab-
lished with the husband as trustee of the wife's portion of the
funds.' 9 The new jurisdiction, then, is protecting the interest
granted by the laws of the domicile at the time of acquisition.
The marital property of a couple who have changed domicile
several times may be apportioned in groups, the respective
groups being designated by two factors: domicile and time. To
remedy possible confusion by these double factors and to provide
convenience at the forum, the California Legislature attempted
to provide for "full mutability" of marital property rights by
shown at page 567 inira. Nonetheless, his commentary added greatly to the estab-
lishment of mutability in marital property rights in movables.
17. "Partial mutability" in that the marital interests in the part of the prop-
erty acquired prior to the change in domicile are retained, but the marital inter-
ests in property acquired after the change in domicile are governed according to
the present domicile. Partial mutability is to be contrasted with the concept of
"full mutability" in which, after a change in domicile, marital interests in all
the property owned (acquired previous to the change in domicile or not) are de-
termined according to the law of the presently existing domicile.
18. Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 921,
123 Am. St. Rep. 944, 13 Am. Cas. 839 (1907) is a leading case. See also Huff v.
Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436 (1851) ; Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz, 235, 284 Pac. 158
(1930) ; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912).
19. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848) and Edwards v. Ed-
wards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924) are the leading cases. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLIOT OF LAWS § 292 (1934).
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passing statutes20 whereby all property brought to California
by persons who became California domiciliaries would become
community property according to the California system. The
attempt was unsuccessful, however, as the Supreme Court of
that state held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that
it operated to deprive a spouse of interests previously vested.
21
This same policy protecting an acquired interest is respon-
sible for what has been termed the "source doctrine." 22 This doc-
trine states that a spouse's interests in property acquired by
exchange are the same as the interests he had in the property
previously held. The source doctrine could be said to be an
exception to the established rule that the law of the domicile at
the time of acquisition governs marital property rights in mov-
ables. Separate or community property can be traced through
any number of transactions so that if property is obtained (when
the spouses have a new domicile) in exchange for property ac-
quired while in their former domicile, the rights granted by
the property system of the former domicile are carried over to
the newly acquired property. Thus movables acquired while
domiciled in a community property state, but purchased with
funds separate by the laws of the former domicile (e.g., those
that were acquired while domiciled in a separate property state)
would be separate property held in exactly the same manner as
the funds brought into the new domicile. 28 Similarly, when mov-
ables are acquired while newly domiciled in a separate property
state, but with community funds, the purchaser is held to be
the trustee of the other spouse holding the one-half interest in a
constructive trust.24 From this it can be seen that a more ac-
curate statement of the conflict of laws rule governing marital
rights in movables would be: Interests in movables acquired by
diprimary" acquisition are determined according to the law of the
20. These statutes were amendments to CAL. CIV. CODE § 164 (Deering 1949).
They are Cal. Stats. 1917, p. 827, and Cal. Stats. 1923, p. 746 (the latter made the
former expressly retroactive). Therein it was provided that property "acquired
after marriage by either husband or wife, including ... personal property wherever
situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired while domiciled elsewhere is community
property."
21. Estate of Bruggemeyer, 115 Cal. App. 525, 2 P.2d 534 (1931) held that
the 1917 amendment was not to be given retroactive effect. The 1923 amendment,
expressly providing that the 1917 act be retroactive, was held to be deprivation
of property without due process of law in violation of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343 (1934).
22. This term came into modern usage through Jacobs, Law of Community
Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1, 37 (1931).
23. Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 921,
123 Am. St. Rep. 944, 13 Am. Cas. 839 (1907) is the leading case.
24. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848) is the leading case.
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domicile at the time of acquisition; interests in movables ac-
quired by exchange, including purchase, are substantially the
same as those existing in the property given in exchange.
Immovables
A state as a unit of power has as its very purpose the proper
provision of law and order. As the enunciator of policies chosen
for the good of its jurisdiction, the state must provide its own
law and carry it out, whether or not it is at variance with
the general rule in other states. States establish systems of
recordation consistent with their own pattern of property laws.
Purchasers and creditors in a state depend on its particular
system being carried out. Stated negatively, if a state were not
able to insure that its law concerning its own property would be
carried out, the uncertainty on the part of prospective creditors
and purchasers would result in a lower valuation of property
throughout the state as well as a substantial hindrance to busi-
ness activity due to the greater risk and thus higher price of
secured loans. These economic factors, as well as the policy of
providing convenient administration at the forum, have led to
the much-reiterated conflict of laws rule: The law of the place
of the immovable (law of the situs) governs marital interests
in immovables.25 With the law of the situs governing, the domi-
cile of the owner would not be a factor in the determination of
the marital property rights. But this rule, like the rule concern-
ing movables, has the provision protecting vested interests -
the source doctrine.26 Thus if property acquired in a separate
property state is exchanged during marriage for immovable
property in a community state, that immovable property is
treated as local separate property.27 Similarly, if an immovable
in a separate property state is acquired in the name of one
spouse, but in exchange for community property, a constructive
trust is held to have been formed as would have been the case
25. Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717 (1852) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 237, 238 (1934) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (3d
ed. 1949). This rule stems from the old theory of territoriality of law, i.e., that
law has effect only on that which is within its borders. The principle of comity,
particularly in the United States, has made great inroads on this theory. See
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (2d ed. 1951).
26. "When parties acquire property, it is to be presumed that they do it in
view of the law as it exists at the time and place, and its character as community
or separate-estate is determined with its first acquisition - nor does changing its
character from personalty to realty, and vice versa, affect the situation." Stephen
v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 239, 284 Pac. 158, 159 (1930).
27. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930) ; Joiner v. Joiner,
131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938).
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if the property acquired were movable. 28 A case illustrating the
conflicts rule regarding immovables, with the vested interests
exception, is Trapp v. United States.29 In that case a taxpayer
husband acquired oil leases in Texas (a community property
state) while domiciled in Oklahoma (a separate property state).
He paid for the property partly with cash acquired in Oklahoma
and partly by personal services rendered to the vendor in Texas.
The court held that the leases were his separate property to the
extent paid for by cash and that they were community property
to the extent paid for by personal services. Note that had the per-
sonal services been paid for by cash and the cash exchanged for
the leases, the leases would have been entirely separate property
because they would have been acquired in exchange for a mov-
able acquired while domiciled in a separate property state. The
court here considered the rendering of personal services in direct
exchange for the immovable a "primary" acquisition. Obviously
the distinction is an artificial one,30 denying that services ren-
dered are "acquired exchangeable property"; but from a func-
tional standpoint this distinction is desirable in that it operates
to have marital rights in immovables determined according to
the law of the situs.8' As illustrated by this case, a more ac-
curate statement of the conflict of laws rule governing immov-
ables would be: The law of the situs governs immovables ac-
quired by "primary" acquisition; when immovables are acquired
by exchange, the marital interests in such immovables are of the
same category as those existing in the property given in ex-
change.
Income from Property
In most civil and common law jurisdictions, income from
property is deemed a separate movable at the time it accrues.3 2
28. Heirs of Dolan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889) ; Stone v.
Sample, 216 Miss. 287, 62 So.2d 307 (1953) ; Chichester v. Chichester, 209 Miss.
628, 48 So.2d 123 (1950) ; Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848).
29. 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
30. The industry, or services, of a man are certainly his property which he
may legitimately exchange. There is no apparent reason why that property being
given in exchange for an immovable should have different consequences than if the
services had been exchanged for money and the money immediately exchanged for
the immovable. There being no strictly legalistic reason for this distinction, the
policy pursuits are shown in relief.
31. Other cases employing this same distinction are Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d
951 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Hammonds v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939) ;
Johnson v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1937). Cases in which immovables
are exchanged directly for services are rare today, but they serve to illustrate the
build-up of policies in conflict of laws decisions; this is especially true with tax
cases in which there are no third parties with which to reckon.
32. 32 AM. JuR. 348 (1941) ; Am. Cas. 1918A 151 et seq. (1918).
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In those jurisdictions the law of the domicile of the spouse would
determine whether the movable thus acquired is community or
separate property. However, some states have passed statutes
characterizing income from an immovable as a mere incident or
characteristic of that immovable. These statutes make possible
a kind of "double-linked" 38 conflict of laws problem. Suppose,
for example, that an immovable is owned by one spouse sep-
arately and this immovable has as its situs a state, the laws of
which make income from an immovable a mere incident of that
immovable. Suppose also that the owning spouse resides in a
community property state the laws of which make income from
an immovable a newly acquired movable. Obviously, if the law
of the situs is to govern in this situation making the income an
incident of the immovable, the income will be the separate prop-
erty of the owner.8 4 But the income would be community prop-
erty if the law of the domicile were held to govern because this
law would have the double function of first designating the in-
come as a newly acquired movable, which makes the conflict of
laws rule regarding movables applicable, and then applying its
domiciliary law to the marital interests making the income com-
munity property. The only case found which involved this par-
ticular "double-linked" type conflict is Commissioner v. Skaggs.8
There the court held that the income was an incident of the im-
movable and therefore separate property. They employed the
following reasoning: "Community property laws were statutes
real and not statutes personal; that is to say they apply to things
within a country's jurisdiction rather than to persons wherever
they may be or go. It should follow that things, whether movable
or immovable, actually situate in a state and effectively within
its power should be governed by the law of that state."8's When
the thought of the all-important policies behind conflict of laws
decisions is abstracted from the reasoning of the court, it ap-
33. "Double-linked" because the determination of the conflict of laws question
of whether or not the property is separate depends on the determination of the
conflicts question of whether or not the income was a newly-acquired movable.
34. The situs could be either a community or separate property state; if the
spouse had acquired it while domiciled in a separate property state, or if he ac-
quired while domiciled in a community state but previous to the marriage, the
property would be owned separately.
35. 122 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1942). In this
case a husband domiciled in Texas was receiving income from a building in Cali-
fornia which he had acquired prior to his marriage. The domestic law of California
provided that income from an immovable was a mere incident of the immovable; the
Texas law provided that income from an immovable became a movable at the time
of accrual. Cf. In re Berchtold, 1 Ch. Div. 192 (Ch. Civ. 1923).
36. 122 F.2d at 723.
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pears that their argument is based on a questionable premise
(i.e., that the property system does not follow its domiciliary
with respect to his property in a foreign jurisdiction). That this
premise is at least questionable in this day and time has been
the heart of the previous discussion concerning movables and
immovables. However, when the policies are considered, the con-
clusion appears desirable.8 7 It provides for convenience at the
forum, the local system of title and property ownership is kept
intact, and there is no conflict with the policy protecting acquired
interests; in fact, the original interests in the property are im-
parted to the produced income.
Rights of Third Parties
The economic policy in having a reliable recordation system,
mentioned as responsible for the situs rule in regard to immov-
ables, as well as the powerful feeling that good faith purchasers
and creditors ought in justice to be protected, have come in con-
flict with the policy protecting acquired interests. Creditors and
purchasers who rely on the public records should not be thwarted
by secret liens existing by virtue of the law of some foreign
jurisdiction; on the other hand a spouse should not lose his or
her interest in property merely because of its being exchanged
for other property. A "compromise" has been effected between
these two opposing propositions. The key to this compromise
is found in the limiting phrase "as between themselves." The
source doctrine is given full scope in controversies between the
spouses themselves where there is no reason not to protect ac-
quired interests. In controversies in which good faith creditors
and purchasers pit their claim of reliance on the public records
against the claim of a hidden interest in the property, the
economic policies protecting transactions prevail.3 8 A state's de
37. This conclusion, that the law of the situs determines whether income from
property is an acquired movable or not, was followed in Stone v. Sample, 216
Miss. 287, 62 So.2d 307 (1953) ; Succession of Packwood, 9 Rob. 438 (La. 1845) ;
Johnson v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1041 (1943), appeal dismissed, 139 F.2d 491
(8th Cir. 1943) ; Estate of Hale, 2 Cof. 191 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1906).
In Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945) the income to a Texas
spouse was from a spendthrift trust established as a gift in New York; there was
no conflict of laws as to this income being movable, but the court went on to say
that because the trust was a spendthrift trust the income was to be treated as
income and not as separate gifts. Presumably, the same would not be true of a
discretionary trust. Accord: Estate of Ernest v. Hinds, 11 T.C. 314 (1948).
38. Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858) and Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 300 (1854)
are the leading cases. See cases cited in 13 L.R.A. 236 (1891) ; 45 Am. JUR. 465,
§ 82 (1943). Of. Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 167, 180 (1943).
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facto power over its immovables and obvious interest therein
are overwhelming factors serving to defeat the source doctrine
when they are in conflict with it.
The policy protecting creditors and purchasers is not as
strong in regard to movables as it is to immovables. 39 With
movables, the sacredness of the public records is usually not an
issue.40 Also, due to the very mobility of the property, there is a
feeling that creditors and purchasers should be on their guard
against the possibility of rights granted in other jurisdictions.
This notion of caveat emptor is certainly one which could be
enunciated as a counter-balancing policy so that the policy pro-
tecting acquired interests of spouses could be effected in face
of the opposing policy protecting third parties. In this area of
the law the clashing policies so nearly balance that each state
may pick its policy without fear of overwhelming counter-argu-
ment.41
The position protecting acquired interests of the spouses ap-
pears to be slightly preferable because of the language used in
the Restatement illustration 42 concerning marital rights in com-
munity-owned movables newly situated in a separate property
state. There it is said that when a creditor of the husband at-
taches the chattels, the validity of the attachment is determined
by the law of the separate property state which would be applied
to the attachment of property owned in common for a debt of
one of the owners. 43 Considering the dearth of decisions and
their lack of uniformity in this area of the law, it would perhaps
be best, in the interest of uniformity throughout the states, to
follow the lead of the Restatement and entrench the policy pro-
tecting spouses' acquired interests in movables.
Louisiana Rule
The Louisiana Legislature has exerted its power over the
marital property within its jurisdiction to a greater extent and
intensity than has any other state. Article 2400 of the Louisiana
Civil Code provides: "All property acquired in this state by non-
39. See 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 373 (1945).
40. The registration of automobiles may be an exception to this.
41. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 380, n. 11 (1949) ; 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 372 (1945) ; Harding, Marital Domicile and
Marital Rights in Movables, 30 MICH. L. REV. 859 (1932).
42. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 (1934).
43. That rights of owners in common are protected in co-owners' dealings with
third parties, see 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 426 (3d ed. 1939).
[Vol. XVIII
COMMENTS
resident married persons, whether the title thereto be in the
name of either the husband or wife, or in their joint names,
shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate
the community of acquets and gains between citizens of this
state." The legislative policy involved, clarifying titles and
thereby protecting creditors and purchasers, is the same as that
envisioned by the California Legislature in 1923.44 The Cali-
fornia Legislature's attempt to enforce this policy was held un-
constitutional, since it divested acquired interests of spouses in
marital property. The Louisiana situation can be readily dis-
tinguished. Only property acquired in Louisiana is affected;
property acquired elsewhere is not altered, as the California
statute provided. Probably, then, the only point at which inter-
ests would be divested under the Louisiana rule would be in the
use of funds, separate by the laws of the state of acquisition, in
exchange for property which becomes community at the ex-
change. 45 But note that the Louisiana Civil Code article provides
that the same provisions of law which regulate the community
of acquets and gains between its citizens shall be applied. And
according to Louisiana internal law a right of reimbursement
is given to a spouse whose separate funds are used as community
property.46 Also according to Louisiana internal law, in absence
of specific affirmative acts on the part of the wife, the husband
is the administrator of the wife's separate property ;47 in this
capacity he is similar to the constructive trustee provided for
in separate property states for the administration of community
property. Thus, with the provisions for reimbursement and ad-
ministration applicable to non-domiciliaries, Louisiana protects
acquired separate property interests in much the same manner
as the separate property states protect community property
interests.
Article 2400 on its face purports to apply the Louisiana law
44. See note 20 supra.
45. Another situation where it could possibly be claimed that there is a di-
vesting of an acquired interest would be where a spouse is domiciled in a separate
property state and works in Louisiana; the money acquired would be community
property according to Article 2400. However, that this is a divesting of his sep-
arate property could probably be denied on the theory that before he went to work
the worker had no "interest," and from the moment of acquisition the property
was and continued to be community property. See Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47,
98 So. 752 (1923). There the court stated that under Article 2400 "all property
acquired in thi8 state by married persons becomes community property regardless
of where both or either of them reside." Id. at 58, 98 So. at 755.
46. LA. C~vIL Cons arts. 3318, 3319, 2404, 2405 (1870). Cf. Cameron v.
Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So.2d 1 (1949). See 77 A.L.R. 1021-25 (1935).
47. LA. CVIL O)z art. 2385 (1870).
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to all property acquired in this state, immovable and movable.
The Louisiana court has made one exception, however, in the
case of Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co. 48 There the court held a cause
of action in tort to be "transitory" since it could be sued on in
any jurisdiction where the defendant could be served with
process and therefore the cause of action was not "property ac-
quired in this state" within the meaning of the statute. By this
rationale the Louisiana court enabled a wrongfully injured
woman, whose husband had disappeared, to bring suit against
her wrongdoer. Whether the making of this exception was justi-
fiable logically, or only by the equities of the particular situation,
or not at all, the exception remains as a fact of the Louisiana
law. The court enunciated its policy; the decision has never been
overruled. 49
It is to be remembered that the conflict of laws rules provided
by the Louisiana Legislature in Article 2400 and the interpreta-
tion the courts have put on it affect only property acquired in
Louisiana. They do not affect property acquired elsewhere by
Louisianians. The ordinary conflict of laws rules prevail in those
situations.
Mathematical Rule-Applying: An Abuse
The preceding discussion focusses attention on rules and
policies for conflict of laws. As the forum confronted with a con-
flict of laws must fit pieces of different puzzles together, it
should conduct its undertaking along equitable principles; it
should not hamper or restrict itself by a rigid, mathematical
application of rules without regard for the policies behind them.
Marital interests in property are particularly susceptible of abuse
in the mathematical rule-applying in conflict of laws situa-
tions. While certain sets of conflict of laws rules are formulated
to correspond and apply to certain categories of relationships or
interests, sometimes virtually the same interest may be placed
in one category by domestic laws of one state and in another
category by domestic laws of another. Thus marital property
laws in one state may protect the interest that is protected by
laws of succession in another state. Community property states
48. 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900). This case is contra to an early fed-
eral decision: Meyerson v. Alter, 11 Fed. 688 (E.D. La. 1882).
49. In Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So.2d 253 (1942), the
Louisiana court expressly refused to overrule the Williams case, but they did allow
recovery for the personal injuries to the wife on the basis of LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
2334, 2402 (1870), making the cause of action the wife's separate property.
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recognize that marriage is a partnership in which a wife, though
not personally bringing in the income, may nevertheless be par-
tially responsible for it because of her proper fulfillment of
wifely duties. For that reason, the marital property laws of those
states give the wife, as her portion of the community, one-half
of the property earned by her husband. This same interest due
the non-acquiring wife is recognized in the separate property
states which provide her with a non-barrable share, by laws of
succession, in the acquisitions of her husband. The conflict of
laws rules for succession, however, are different from those for
marital property. The pertinent conflict of laws rule for suc-
cessions is: The domicile of the decedent at the time of his death
provides the law for the succession. 0 The conflict of laws rule
for marital property, regarding such earnings, is: The law of
the domicile at the time of acquisition determines the interests
in the property acquired.51 Within any single jurisdiction the
laws of succession and marital property are set up to comple-
ment one another. Obviously, a state which protects the wife's
interest by giving her a community interest need not provide for
her in the laws of succession and, conversely, a state which pro-
vides for her by succession laws need not give her a community
interest in her husband's earnings.
Though the laws of more than one state are involved in these
conflict of laws situations, the general policies or objectives of
the laws of each state are the same. But note the anomaly created
by a rigid application of the conflict of laws rules. A husband
and wife had been domiciled in a separate property state for the
major part of their lives; the husband's unexpended earnings
amounted to about $200,000.00.52 Upon retirement the couple
moved to a community property state, California, and established
their domicile. At the death of the husband the wife claimed a
portion of this money against a third party to whom the entire
amount had been willed. With mathematical exactness the court
applied the rules of conflict of laws: The domicile at the time
of acquisition classifies the property as to whether it is separate
or not, and that domicile (the separate property state) classifies
all the property as the "separate" property of the husband. The
domicile at death (the community property state) provides the
50. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 501 (1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 301, 303 (1934).
51. See note 14 supra. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2400 (1870) makes Louisiana an
exception to this. See discussion of the Louisiana rule at page 568 supra.
52. In re O'Conner's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933).
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succession laws, and by those laws the wife gets no non-barrable
share of her husband's "separate" property. Therefore, the wife
gets nothing.53
Obviously such a result was not contemplated by the laws of
either state. The fallacy in the reasoning lies in the use of the
term "separate property." This term is used by the court as if
it had the same meaning in every state; but actually the mean-
ings are different because each type jurisdiction has employed
the term "separate property" in accordance with its own method
of accomplishing the same desired end or policy. In the internal
law of the separate property state, the term is used to mean
property earned by the husband during married life. In the com-
munity property state, on the other hand, it is used to mean
property which, though the husband's, was specifically not
earned during the married life. Thus the terms are given exactly
contradictory meanings. The policy behind both jurisdictions
was defeated because the court overlooked the divergency of
these two property systems since both systems happened to em-
ploy the same term. In these dual approach areas of law the
forum, in making a choice of law, should view the law of the
respective states as a whole, and then make its choice.
Assuming that in the future the fallacy involved in this de-
cision will be recognized as such, the courts will be faced with
the problem of whether to apply the entire law of the domicile
at the time of acquisition, which in the case above would have
allowed the wife a one-third non-barrable share, or to apply the
entire law of the domicile at the time of death, which would
here have given the wife one-half of the earnings of her husband
as community. It appears that two considerations form the basis
for the proper choice: (1) The realization that marital property
laws have been held to vest present interests- attempts to di-
vest them have been held unconstitutional.54 (2) The realization
that interests granted by succession laws are inchoate, mere ex-
53. The theoretical problems involved in this type situation and the injustice
of such a conclusion has been often discussed, usually in connection with the famous
Maltese Marriage Case, Court of Appeals of Algiers, Dec. 24, 1889, 18 JOURNAL
Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL 1171 (France 1891), in which case the same type rea-
soning was employed and the same conclusion reached as in the O'Conner case.
See CrHs E, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 1938); MARSH, MARITAL
PROPERTY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAws 77-90 (1952); WOLF, PRIVATE INTERNA-
TiONAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 1938). It is agreed that the failure to choose one or the
other entire system of law was the wrong course of action, but there is little dis-
cussion as to what law should have been chosen and as to what was the proper
reasoning process by which to choose.
54. See note 21 supra.
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pectancies - it is well established that any state may change its
succession laws leaving unfulfilled the succession expectancies
in presently owned property. 5 With these two considerations in
mind the proper step would appear to be to apply the entire law
of the domicile of acquisition. This conforms the "non-vested"
succession law to the vested marital property law and not vice
versa. The issue in question would be treated for conflict of laws
purposes as entirely one of marital property, so the law of the
domicile would be applied. The succession laws of the domicile
of acquisition would then be applied as part of the marital prop-
erty laws of that domicile, which in one true sense they are -
being complements, corollaries to marital property laws.
Had such a conclusion, protecting the interests of the spouses,
been reached in the case discussed above, the property would
have remained the separate property of the husband during his
lifetime and a one-third non-barrable succession interest would
have gone to the widow at his death, as would have been pro-
vided by the entire law of the domicile of acquisition. That she
should be protected was surely contemplated in the laws of both
states.
It is well to keep in mind the truism that conflict of laws
rules are mere enunciations of policy. The rules are helpful as a
means of reaching decisions when certain set-of-fact situa-
tions are involved, but it is the policies (the substance) not the
rules (mere forms) which are important. Conflict of laws rules
exist because of their function of carrying out policies; they
should be used accordingly.
Philip E. Henderson
55. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW §§ 189, 216 (1935).
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